OpenAI Bans 2 Russian and Iranian Influence Operations, Including First Category 5 Case
Updated
Updated · OpenAI · Oct 8
OpenAI Bans 2 Russian and Iranian Influence Operations, Including First Category 5 Case
2 articles · Updated · OpenAI · Oct 8
Summary
Two covert campaigns were removed after OpenAI said they used its models to run “false front” influence operations that planted geopolitical messaging through media outlets and other channels.
Russia’s “Dark Clark” operation, rated Category 5 on OpenAI’s 1-to-6 breakout scale, used ChatGPT mainly for internal reporting while covertly running a Latin America think tank and spreading fake leaks, audio and documents.
Iran’s “Bogus Bylines” campaign used 7 fake journalist personas to pitch long-form articles on the US-Iran conflict, placing nearly 100 pieces across roughly a dozen small and mid-sized outlets; its social-media comments drew little engagement.
OpenAI said both campaigns resembled pre-AI influence operations but used AI to scale drafting, translation and editorial work, helping operators exploit unwitting editors, staff and audiences.
The company said this is the first Category 5 operation it has disrupted among 30 covert influence campaigns exposed over the past two and a half years, reinforcing that media placement can deliver wider reach than fake social posts.
What hidden digital breadcrumbs allowed OpenAI to uncover these complex, VPN-cloaked foreign influence operations before they could cause further geopolitical damage?
How did a fake AI-managed persona successfully trick real researchers into producing legitimate content for a covert Russian influence campaign?
If AI can generate endless propaganda, why do sophisticated foreign networks still struggle to build genuine audience trust and distribute their deceptive content?
OpenAI’s Breakout Scale: How Generative AI Supercharged Russian and Iranian Influence Operations—and What It Means for Global Information Security
Overview
In October 2026, OpenAI disrupted two major state-linked influence operations: Russia’s 'Dark Clark' and Iran’s 'Storm-2035.' Russian operators used ChatGPT to create fake reports and documents, successfully deceiving Latin American schools and politicians, which led to OpenAI rating the campaign as a high-impact Category 5. Similarly, Iranian operators used ChatGPT to refine articles and social media content, placing over 100 pieces in real publications and earning a Category 4 rating. These AI-driven campaigns not only manipulated public opinion but also inflamed diplomatic tensions, such as between Ukraine and Poland, showing how generative AI is making global disinformation more effective and harder to detect.